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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2801 
__________ 
 
SEAN M. DONAHUE, 
                                 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
 
DAUPHIN COUNTY SOLICITORS OFFICE, Harrisburg, PA; DAUPHIN COUNTY 
PRISON, Harrisburg, PA; PA STATE CAPITOL POLICE, BUREAU OF POLICE AND 
SAFETY, Harrisburg, PA; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL 
SERVICES, Harrisburg, PA; UNKNOWN DAUPHIN COUNTY PRISON GUARDS 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE EMPLOYEES, Harrisburg, PA; KATIE LYNN ADAM, 
Prosecutor, Dauphin County District Attorney’s Office; RICHARD C. SCHUR, 
Corporal, Bureau of Police & Safety, Harrisburg, PA; LISA M. SAUDER, General 
Counsel, PA Department of Labor and Industry; MARY JANE MCMILLAN, PA Human 
Relations Commission; HEATHER ROTH, PA Human Relations Commission 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-17-cv-01084) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 4, 2018 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., BIBAS and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  October 10, 2019) 
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___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Sean Donahue appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his 
civil-rights complaint.  For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.   
 In November 2014, Donahue sent threatening emails to numerous employees of 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  The emails concerned, generally, Donahue’s belief 
that these employees had improperly prevented him from obtaining a civil-service job.  
Based on these emails, Donahue was charged with two counts of harassment and one 
count of terroristic threats.  After a jury trial in the Dauphin County Court of Common 
Pleas, Donahue was convicted of the harassment charges and the terrorist-threats charge 
was dismissed.  Donahue appealed his conviction, and the Superior Court affirmed.  See 
Commonwealth v. Donahue, No. 1469 MDA 2016, 2017 WL 2418390, at *1 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. June 5, 2017).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Donahue’s petition for 
allowance of appeal, see Commonwealth v. Donahue, 180 A.3d 1211 (Pa. 2018) (table), 
and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, see Donahue v. Pennsylvania, 138 
S. Ct. 2626 (2018). 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Donahue then filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District Court.  He 
alleged that the defendants had pursued the criminal charges based on personal animosity 
and to prevent him from being eligible to obtain a civil-service job.  A Magistrate Judge 
issued a report and recommendation concluding that the claims should be dismissed as 
barred by the favorable-termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  
Over Donahue’s objections, the District Court adopted the report and recommendation 
and dismissed Donahue’s complaint.  Donahue then filed a timely notice of appeal to this 
Court. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise a plenary 
standard of review.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 On appeal,1 Donahue first argues that the Heck bar should not apply because he 
was not convicted of the terrorist-threats charge.  We are not persuaded.  To maintain a 
civil-rights claim that, if successful, would demonstrate the invalidity of a criminal 
conviction, a plaintiff must show that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor.  
                                              
1 We will consider only those issues that Donahue has properly raised in his brief.  See 
Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 
(3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for 
those purposes a passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue before 
this court.” (quotation marks, alteration omitted); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 
F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that pro se litigants “must abide by the same rules 
that apply to all other litigants”).  Further, because, as detailed below, we conclude that 
Donahue has not identified any error in the District Court’s conclusion that the matter is 
barred by the favorable-termination rule, we need not reach his challenges to the District 
Court’s alternative rulings concerning certain defendants’ immunity.  See, e.g., Menkes 
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 762 F.3d 285, 294 n.8 (3d Cir. 2014).  
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See Bronowicz v. Allegheny County, 804 F.3d 338, 346 (3d Cir. 2015).  We have ruled 
that the simultaneous conviction on some counts and acquittal on others does not qualify 
as a favorable termination if “the charges aim[ed] to punish one course of conduct.”  
Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  That is precisely what 
occurred here, where the harassment and terroristic-threats charges aimed to punish 
Donahue for sending the same four emails.  See Donahue, 2017 WL 2418390, at *1.  
Thus, Donahue has failed to show that the criminal charges were terminated in his favor. 
 Next, Donahue contends that his claims should have been construed as alleging 
abuse of process as opposed to malicious prosecution.  However, “a section 1983 claim 
for malicious abuse of process lies where prosecution is initiated legitimately and 
thereafter is used for a purpose other than that intended by the law.”  Rose v. Bartle, 871 
F.2d 331, 350 n.17 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Because Donahue 
claimed that the criminal action was improper from the start, the District Court did not err 
in construing his claim as one of malicious prosecution.  See id.; cf. Zimmerman v. 
Corbett, 873 F.3d 414, 418-19 & nns. 24-27 (3d Cir. 2017) (discussing similar claims 
under malicious-prosecution framework).   
 Donahue also contends that § 1983 relief must be available to him, 
notwithstanding his lack of a favorable termination, because he does not have an avenue 
for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  Even assuming that Donahue is correct that he cannot 
challenge his conviction via § 2254, cf. Lee v. Stickman, 357 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 
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2004) (explaining that “being on probation meets the ‘in custody’ requirement for 
purposes of the habeas statute”), we have previously “held that a plaintiff who had never 
been incarcerated and who had no recourse under the habeas statute was nevertheless 
subject to Heck’s favorable termination rule.”  Bronowicz, 804 F.3d at 345 n.12.  
Moreover, while Donahue argues that Heck’s rule is unconstitutional, we are bound to 
follow the Supreme Court’s decision.  See, e.g., Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 210 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
